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1. Introduction and Scope
[1] We thank Beven et al. [2012], hereafter referred to as
B12, for taking the time to comment on our opinion paper
[Clark et al., 2011a]. We are pleased that our paper piqued
their interest, and we are pleased that B12 agree with much
of what we say. We also welcome the opportunity to elabo-
rate on our critique of the Generalized Likelihood Uncer-
tainty Estimation (GLUE) methodology.
[2] The B12 comment sets the stage for some interesting
discussion and debate. While the B12 comment is primarily
focused on expressing their opinions about the superiority
of GLUE over Bayesian approaches, the comment provides
a good summary of many important challenges in hydro-
logical sciences, including the B12 perspective on hypothe-
sis-testing. In doing so, the B12 comment brings to the
forefront the fundamental issues that we must address as
we collectively seek to improve the ﬁdelity of our models.
[3] Our response below highlights the need for a carefully
controlled approach to model evaluation. This was one of
the central aims of our opinion paper, where we present a
methodology which entails both (1) isolating the constituent
hypotheses in a model (e.g., experimenting with different
options for speciﬁc processes and/or scaling behavior, while
keeping all other components of the model ﬁxed); and (2)
using the available data and physical insights in creative
ways to scrutinize different modeling alternatives. Elements
of this methodology have been applied in several recent
studies using a mix of qualitative and quantitative diagnos-
tics [e.g., Clark et al., 2011b; Kavetski et al., 2011], and
using the extended GLUE framework [e.g., Krueger et al.,
2010]. The controlled approach to model evaluation we
advocate in our opinion paper—and in the response below—
requires a combination of multiple tools and strategies to
pursue the several distinct aspects of this methodology, with
Bayesian methods being one of these tools.
[4] Our response identiﬁes a great deal of common
ground between our opinions and the sentiments expressed
in B12. Although B12 may disagree with our choice of
methods, including standard probability theory, statistics,
and Bayesian techniques, we do share several broader aims
and perspectives. In particular we agree with B12 that ‘‘We
want a tool that will be useful in simulation or prediction and
that reﬂects our qualitative perceptual knowledge of real-
world processes.’’ We are hence conﬁdent that our exchange
adds to the ongoing constructive discussion on the suitability
of different model analysis strategies, and helps deﬁne tracta-
ble ways forward for those interested in improving the pro-
cess of model development and evaluation.
[5] Our response to the B12 comment is structured as
follows. First, we review the B12 summary of the major
science challenges in hydrological model analysis and
consider how these challenges are pursued in our multiple
hypothesis methodology. Second, we question the B12
defense of GLUE, pointing out that the aspects in which
GLUE actually differs from Bayesian methods do not
address the real challenges of an inference framework.
Rather they simply weaken its descriptive, predictive and
diagnostic capabilities, including the rigor with which model
hypotheses can be tested. Third, we discuss the B12 perspec-
tives on our modeling approach, emphasizing the impor-
tance of controlled approaches to model rejection and the
need for subjectivity when stronger knowledge is not avail-
able. In responding to B12, our aim is to encourage hydrolo-
gists to think more critically of the fundamental premises,
assumptions and limitations of different model analysis
methodologies.
2. B12 Discussion of the Major Science
Challenges
[6] We agree with B12 when they articulate many of the
research challenges facing the community, including (1)
the presence of epistemic errors due to limited process
understanding/representation and data limitations; (2) the
danger of spuriously rejecting model hypotheses simply
because of data errors, and (3) avoiding overﬁtting when
the various sources of error cannot be characterized or dis-
tinguished in a meaningful way. These are challenges for
any modeling framework, whether based on theoretical
arguments or on ad hoc considerations. The purpose of our
opinion paper was to analyze tractable strategies that will
allow the community to address some of these outstanding
modeling challenges in a systematic and carefully con-
trolled way.
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2.1. Epistemic Errors
[7] We agree with B12 when they emphasize the need to
study epistemic errors in more detail – indeed, the very
objective of scientiﬁc hydrology is to investigate and reduce
epistemic errors. This includes improving process under-
standing through a combination of ﬁeldwork and modeling,
avoiding oversimpliﬁed models, identifying inadequate data
(e.g., a sparse rain gauge network where all stations record
zero precipitation during some storm events), and other
tasks. Furthermore, given inevitable approximations in envi-
ronmental modeling, it is the very goal of uncertainty analy-
sis to quantify these approximation errors as meaningfully as
possible. For example, Gupta et al. [2012] argue that a major
modeling challenge is in detecting epistemic errors, charac-
terizing their impact, attributing their cause, and correcting
them, suggesting ‘‘it is to the problem of underlying episte-
mic cause (things we could in principle, but do not in prac-
tice, know) that our collective brainpower, curiosity and
investigation must be directed.’’
[8] The merits of different strategies to characterize lack
of knowledge are the subject of ongoing debates in the
broader science community, with discussions involving com-
pelling qualitative and quantitative arguments, and with
many distinct formalisms being proposed, including Bayesian
methods, fuzzy theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, and others.
All have their strengths and weaknesses, and the debates are
unlikely to settle any time soon. The proposition by B12, ela-
borated in their earlier opinion pieces [e.g., Beven, 2006;
Beven et al., 2011; Beven and Westerberg, 2011], that proba-
bility theory and statistics are unsuitable for representing, or
even approximating, lack of knowledge is just one of several
views, rather than some established and accepted result.
[9] In our opinion, the presence of epistemic uncertainty
does not require abandoning probabilistic frameworks.
Ascertaining whether or not a particular source of uncertainty
has been adequately characterized, or, more accurately,
approximated, probabilistically is best pursued using quanti-
tative hypothesis-testing (where different descriptions of the
errors are hypothesized and tested a posteriori), rather than a
priori by attempting to classify the error as epistemic or alea-
tory. As a simple example, calibration and validation provide
direct quantitative estimates of the total errors (whether or
not they are epistemic!), and modelers are free to experiment
and test different probabilistic descriptions of these errors.
These error descriptions can then be improved, including,
where relevant, detecting and representing various nonstatio-
narities, distinguishing between data of different quality, and,
where necessary, censoring data of particularly poor quality.
What B12 describe as ‘‘disinformative’’ data is also amena-
ble to such analysis. As these improvements are carried out,
and this may clearly take considerable effort, the potential
for overestimating the information content of the data
(‘‘overconditioning’’) is reduced—again, whether or not the
errors are epistemic or aleatory! Put simply, the more data
we have, and the better its quality, the more we can begin
characterizing and distinguishing different sources of error.
[10] A critical point here—overlooked in the B12
comment—is that the problem of epistemic errors is clearly
much broader than a statistical one (see also the discussion
in Sivapalan [2009]). While characterizing errors, includ-
ing epistemic errors, is achieved through uncertainty
analysis, reducing epistemic errors, including the effects of
nonstationarites, is achieved through model improvements
(to the extent that our process understanding and observatio-
nal capabilities allow it). Our view is that investigating epis-
temic errors requires a more controlled—and more
thoughtful—approach to model development and evalua-
tion. In our opinion, it requires moving away from ‘‘blunt’’
approaches that do not identify speciﬁc model weaknesses,
and instead adopting more incisive model analysis methods,
in particular, the multiple hypothesis approach described in
our opinion paper.
[11] The key message of our opinion paper is not Bayes-
ian statistics—rather it is the need to decompose a model
into its constituent hypotheses, including both the represen-
tation of individual processes and representations of how
different processes combine to create the system-scale
response—and attempting, inasmuch as possible, to evalu-
ate each hypothesis separately, accounting for data uncer-
tainty. In our opinion this provides the best opportunity to
diagnose and remedy model deﬁciencies (epistemic error),
without obscuring them by compensatory errors in different
parts of the model. It also allows meaningfully attributing
speciﬁc changes in the model behavior and predictive abil-
ity to speciﬁc, controlled changes in the model structure,
without being confounded by a multitude of uncontrolled
differences.
[12] Applying any model in prediction, especially in
extrapolation, is certainly susceptible to system nonstatio-
narity. This is evidently case speciﬁc. While in some cases
existing nonstationarities could be detected from available
data and reﬂected in the model structure and/or statistical
error description, our only hope to anticipate genuine shifts
in environmental behavior lies in process understanding,
and in adequately estimating future forcing conditions.
2.2. Accounting for Data Errors and Avoiding
Overfitting
[13] We agree with B12 that it is important to avoid
‘‘rejecting models that might be useful in prediction simply
because of errors in the input data and evaluation observa-
tions.’’ Indeed, we state in our opinion paper: ‘‘Practical
issues such as data availability and data quality necessarily
affect the insights that can be gained in a particular hydro-
logical system—put simply; data uncertainty constrains
our ability to discriminate among competing hydrological
hypotheses.’’
[14] In our opinion, the only way to avoid this problem is
to pursue a better quantiﬁcation of data errors [e.g., see
Renard et al., 2011] and to collect new independent data
whenever possible (including developing new measure-
ment technologies). We have an entire section in our opin-
ion paper [Clark et al., 2011a] dedicated to stringent model
diagnostics and the ‘‘clever use of data.’’ We also empha-
size statements made by others in the community that the use
of streamﬂow data in model evaluation needs to go beyond
simply computing sum of squared differences between simu-
lated and observed streamﬂow (a point also stressed by
Beven in the ‘‘limits of acceptability’’ papers). Moreover, we
clearly acknowledge that the data and insights necessary for
meaningful model evaluation are currently only available in
a few research catchments. This represents a major challenge
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for the community, which must be addressed through collect-
ing additional data in a range of different hydrologic settings.
3. B12 Defense of GLUE
[15] The central claims of B12 are (1) Bayesian approaches
to statistical inference are a special case of GLUE; and (2)
Bayesian approaches make strong and unjustiﬁed assumptions
about the error characteristics – although it is unclear to us
what B12 view as the assumptions of GLUE, and whether
(and why) they view these assumptions as justiﬁed. On the
basis of these claims, B12 propose that GLUE is a more
‘‘common sense’’ approach to model evaluation and hypothe-
sis testing, and claim that the extended GLUE methodology
(termed the ‘‘limits of acceptability’’ approach), unlike Bayes-
ian methods, already offers concrete avenues for resolving
the ‘‘nonideal’’ modeling problems facing the hydrological
modeling community. Here we consider the differences
and similarities between GLUE and Bayesian approaches,
and question whether GLUE is suitable for rigorous model
inference, evaluation and predictive use.
3.1. Is GLUE Beginning to Move Toward Bayesian
Methods?
[16] Consider the differences and similarities between
Bayesian methods and GLUE. In Bayesian analysis, the pos-
terior distribution of inferred quantities  given observed
data D and a prior distribution pðÞ is given by Bayes equa-
tion, pðjDÞ / pðDjÞpðÞ. In GLUE, the likelihood func-
tion pðDjÞ is replaced by a pseudo-likelihood function
fPLðD; Þ, yielding fGLUEð;DÞ / fPLðD; ÞpðÞ. The differ-
ence is much deeper than just what function to plug into the
likelihood. While in the Bayesian methods the predictions
are computed in a way that is consistent with the selected
likelihood function (e.g., including residual errors, parameter
stochasticity, etc.), virtually all GLUE studies have relied
exclusively on parametric uncertainty (i.e., the ensemble of
‘‘behavioral’’ parameter sets) to compute the prediction lim-
its. Another key difference is that while Bayesian methods
allow the individual approximations and assumptions made
when formulating the likelihood function to be scrutinized
and improved a posteriori, we are not aware of how to disen-
tangle, scrutinize and relax the various assumptions hidden
within the pseudo-likelihood functions typically used in
GLUE studies. In our opinion, it is irrational for B12 to claim
that Bayesian methods are ﬂawed because some particular
applications have used ‘‘unrealistic’’ likelihood functions,
given that a key component of Bayesian analysis is posterior
diagnostics to evaluate and improve the adequacy of the like-
lihood function. The next sections elaborate on these points.
3.1.1. Bayesian Approach
[17] A Bayesian modeler would not claim to have the
‘‘correct’’ likelihood in any particular application, much
like it would take a brave hydrologist to claim they have
the ‘‘correct’’ hydrological model. Instead, the explicit aim
of ‘‘formal’’ Bayesian modeling is to try to get as close as
possible to this ideal – again, just like a hydrologist would
like their model to be as realistic as possible. This is
accomplished by iterating the following steps: (1) explic-
itly formulate all the knowledge and assumptions that the
modeler is prepared to use when formulating the likelihood
function and the prior. This may include data error analysis
[e.g., Renard et al., 2011], structural error representations
[e.g., Bulygina and Gupta, 2011], and is not limited to
additive error models [e.g., Renard et al., 2011]. Mixtures
and combinations of time- and/or space-varying (i.e., non-
stationary) distributions can also be used, e.g., if residual
error analysis or any other considerations suggest that the
properties of errors change in time and/or in space; (2)
investigate the posterior distribution, e.g., using sampling;
(3) apply posterior diagnostics, including predictive tests
using independent data, to scrutinize these assumptions;
and (4) where appropriate, revise the likelihood function,
collect new data, and, in case of incompatibilities, question
the prior knowledge. The iterated application of steps (1)–
(4) follows the basic principles of scientiﬁc hypothesis-test-
ing, where modelers propose hypotheses (assumptions),
and test them against available evidence.
[18] All these steps have been thoroughly documented in
widely available Bayesian references, such as Box and Tiao
[1973]. The fact that these steps are often poorly followed
in conceptual hydrological modeling gives B12 every right
to question these hydrological applications and their con-
clusions. But before their critique of the Bayesian princi-
ples can be taken seriously, it should directly challenge
steps (1)–(4) and provide a convincing explanation of why
they see it beneﬁcial to short circuit these steps by inventing
concepts such as ‘‘pseudo-likelihood’’ at the expense of fore-
going the aim that prediction limits be quantitatively inter-
pretable. We will return to these issues in section 3.2.1.
3.1.2. GLUE Approach
[19] In contrast to Bayesian modelers, B12 appear to pre-
sume that epistemic uncertainty is impossible to character-
ize using probability theory. Some of their concerns appear
misplaced. For example, probability theory and statistics
are not limited to the uncorrelated Gaussian distribution (a
point we return to in section 4.2). B12 also appear to
question key identities of probability theory, such as the
multiplicative conditional probability equation p(AB) ¼
p(AjB)p(B), from which Bayes equation and other key rela-
tions are derived [Ang and Tang, 2007]. However, apart
from its rather categorical nature, this B12 conjecture does
not explain, let alone prove, why the so-called ‘‘informal’’
likelihood functions recommended in GLUE publications,
such as the Nash-Sutcliffe index, are any better suited to
this task. What, if any, are the requirements imposed by the
GLUE methodology on the ‘‘pseudo’’-likelihood function,
how are these requirements different from the requirements
in Bayesian likelihoods, and how does the GLUE method-
ology test and better satisfy these requirements?
[20] More importantly from a hypothesis-testing per-
spective, what assumptions should a GLUE modeler test af-
ter they have speciﬁed their pseudo-likelihood function?
For example, most GLUE studies (including most of the
B12 publications prior to 2006) use the Nash-Sutcliffe
index as the pseudo-likelihood. We would welcome a clear
quantitative explanation from B12 of whether they believe
the Nash-Sutcliffe index makes fewer assumptions than the
uncorrelated constant-variance Gaussian error model used
in the most primitive Bayesian schemes. We would also
welcome a clear statement of what these assumptions are,
how a GLUE modeler would go about testing them quanti-
tatively, and, most importantly, how they could be system-
atically relaxed if the modeler is dissatisﬁed. In the absence
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of such explanations, we reiterate that the assumptions
underlying the GLUE inference and predictions are difﬁcult
to disentangle and are hence hidden from scrutiny.
Although using the Nash-Sutcliffe as if it were a likelihood
function could produce ‘‘dotty’’ plots that appear ‘‘reasona-
ble’’ to a given modeler, this does not address the question
of quantitative and iterative hypothesis testing.
3.1.3. ‘‘Extended’’ GLUE Approach
[21] Now let us elaborate on our opinion that GLUE is
shifting toward mainstream Bayesian methods—a point
where B12 clearly disagree. If we inspect the actual equa-
tions used in the more recent ‘‘extended’’ GLUE methodol-
ogy (the limits of acceptability approach) we can see the
gradual replacement of the Nash-Sutcliffe index with
increasingly elaborate functions, including ‘‘rectangular’’
error measures [Winsemius et al., 2009], ‘‘triangular’’ error
measures [e.g., Liu et al., 2009; Westerberg et al., 2011]
and ‘‘trapezoidal’’ error measures [Blazkova and Beven,
2009; Krueger et al., 2010]. These measures are beginning
to explicitly and quantitatively reﬂect particular insights
and assumptions made by the modeler regarding the magni-
tude and distribution of data and model errors. Evidently
such error measures are much closer to describing pðDjÞ
than the rather arbitrarily picked Nash-Sutcliffe metric. We
can begin seeing these error measures as error models,
except that instead of Gaussian assumptions the ‘‘new’’
GLUE modelers are making uniform, triangular and trape-
zoidal assumptions. Just as in the simplest Bayesian
schemes, such assumptions are still applied to the residual
errors (because that’s what the GLUE error measures are
applied to), and they are still applied independently from
time step to time step, hence ignoring the error autocorrela-
tion. Finally, since the parameter distributions (weights)
are kept ﬁxed after calibration and the residual errors are
neglected (we disagree with B12 that ‘‘they are usually
considered implicitly’’—what does this really mean, and
how can this ‘‘implicit’’ treatment be scrutinized?), we
question whether GLUE can represent any kind of nonsta-
tionarity at all.
3.1.4. Is GLUE a Simplified and Incomplete
Application of Bayesian Principles?
[22] A remaining question is how to test the assumptions
on data and model errors in the ‘‘new’’ GLUE methodol-
ogy. Following a careful reading of the studies cited by
B12, we did not see any posterior diagnostics applied to
test the new pseudo-likelihoods. For example, how does a
GLUE modeler check the ‘‘nonmultiplicative’’ GLUE
methods for combining probabilities? Can the data be used
to a posteriori suggest or reﬁne the form of the pseudo-like-
lihood function (e.g., triangular)? What guidance, beyond
standard statistical tests (which, according to Beven [2006],
GLUE may not even be intended to satisfy!), is available to
improve on these strong and, as yet, unjustiﬁed assump-
tions? The description of the pseudo-likelihood function as
part of the ‘‘audit trail’’ mentioned by B12 is indeed essen-
tial documentation, but does not, in itself, provide any scru-
tiny of its assumptions. It is for this reason we stated in the
opinion paper that new GLUE studies, while moving closer
to Bayesian principles, are still some way from applying
adequate posterior scrutiny to their assumptions.
[23] The absence of any synthetic testing is a particular
concern. Have B12 investigated the properties of their
limits of acceptability approach using synthetic data? Ev-
ery published study conﬁrms that unless the likelihood func-
tion provides an adequate description of the data and model
errors, poor inference and prediction are obtained even for
synthetic data [e.g., Stedinger et al., 2008]. For example, in
all the experiments carried out by Montanari [2005], GLUE
underestimated the total uncertainty of the model predic-
tions, in many cases by a substantial amount. Given the poor
performance of the GLUE approach on ‘‘ideal’’ test cases, it
is rather difﬁcult to accept the B12 claim that their methods
are a ‘‘more common sense approach’’ for ‘‘nonideal’’ mod-
eling problems. In our opinion, published critiques such as
Mantovan and Todini [2006] and Stedinger et al. [2008]
have correctly demonstrated the fundamental theoretical and
practical ﬂaws of GLUE, and, while we appreciate some of
their general motivation, we were not convinced by the argu-
ments proposed in subsequent responses including Beven
et al. [2008], Beven and Westerberg [2011] and others.
[24] It is this analysis of GLUE—old and new—that
gives us reason to view GLUE as a simpliﬁed, incomplete
application of some Bayesian principles. In our view,
GLUE is an intermediate, largely ad hoc step between cali-
bration schemes where the modeler simply speciﬁes the
objective function they want to use, and more rigorous
probabilistic approaches that aim to formulate the objective
function in a way that comes as close as possible to provid-
ing not just point estimates of the quantities of interest
(parameters, predictions, etc.), but also quantitatively inter-
pretable uncertainty estimates.
3.2. A ‘‘Common Sense’’ Approach to Model
Evaluation?
[25] B12 make the claim that GLUE ‘‘does allow a more
common sense approach to model evaluation and hypothe-
sis testing.’’ This claim deserves further scrutiny. In the fol-
lowing sections, we assess if the claim is supported by
previously published papers on the limits of acceptability
approach.
3.2.1. Is GLUE Suitable for Uncertainty
Quantification?
[26] Consider the key purpose of quantitative uncertainty
analysis methods—that is, to provide quantitative estimates
of the uncertainty in the model predictions and/or quantita-
tive estimates of the uncertainty in the model parameters.
Yet the meaning and utility of the GLUE dotty plots as esti-
mated parameter distributions is dubious, and the GLUE
Manifesto acknowledges that the prediction limits in
GLUE are not even intended to satisfy even basic require-
ments such as encompassing the relevant fractions of obser-
vations [Beven, 2006].
[27] If GLUE uncertainty estimates have no quantitative
signiﬁcance, then what is the point of afﬁxing numerical
values to these quantities? Can these quantities be some-
how veriﬁed? What are their detailed underlying assump-
tions? And, more generally, what is the output of the
GLUE methodology that is at least intended to be quantita-
tively interpretable, and what is its interpretation? Based
on these considerations, is it really appropriate to view
GLUE as a quantitative uncertainty analysis methodology?
Here, we concur with Montanari [2007] that GLUE as such
is a basic sensitivity analysis method, not an uncertainty
analysis framework. The suggestion by B12 that Bayesian
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methods are a special case of GLUE is a rather strong and
perplexing misrepresentation.
3.2.2. Does GLUE in Itself Diagnose Model
Weaknesses?
[28] In describing the ‘‘limits of acceptability’’ approach,
B12 note that ‘‘posterior analysis of the residuals . . . may
be a guide for model improvements or querying the useful-
ness of particular periods of calibration data.’’ We agree,
and indeed residual error analysis and data quality checks
have been the staple of science and statistics for many dec-
ades. Their usefulness is precisely in helping detect outliers,
questionable data, periods of poor model performance,
etc.—thus directly testing the hypothesized hydrological
model and any hypothesized data and structural error
models.
[29] This leads to a more general question: does GLUE
in itself provide any new tools for understanding model
weaknesses, besides standard analysis of model residuals
and data quality checks? Or is it the case that many of
B12’s hydrological insights can also be employed in more
general approaches?
[30] We contend that effectively diagnosing model weak-
nesses requires controlling for compensatory errors in differ-
ent parts of the model—a point made by many authors
including Kuczera and Franks [2002], Beven [2006], and
Gupta et al. [2008]. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the tools of
statistical inference and prediction, including tests such as
residual error analysis, will be most powerful when applied
within a multiple hypothesis methodology that evaluates
and compares alternative modeling decisions using multi-
variate data, ﬁeldwork and process-oriented insights. At
least one of the recent GLUE applications embarks on this
path [e.g., Krueger et al., 2010], and the key insights and
advances presented there, in particular the testing of multi-
ple modeling alternatives, are not GLUE-speciﬁc.
[31] Our main point here is that GLUE, in itself, does not
protect against compensatory behavior. Rather, compensa-
tory errors are problematic in any study reliant on aggregated
measures of model performance, whether using ‘‘formal’’ or
‘‘informal’’ statistics. Indeed, the hydrological insights avail-
able in the more recent ‘‘limits of acceptability’’ papers
[Blazkova and Beven, 2009; Westerberg et al., 2011] cited
in B12 as examples of hypothesis-testing using GLUE are
also limited by compensatory errors. As an illustration,West-
erberg et al. [2011] pose the question: ‘‘Are these . . . models
then acceptable hypotheses of the hydrological processes in
the respective catchments, or should they be rejected?’’, yet
limit their comparison to differences between observed and
simulated discharge, without inspecting internal model dy-
namics, other data, or process-oriented diagnostics that might
better test the assemblage of hypotheses in their models. As
such, we see the use of multiple data sources and multiple
diagnostics [e.g., Kuczera and Mroczkovski, 1998; Freer
et al., 2004] as possible, indeed, highly desirable, in any
modeling framework.
[32] Can we, as a community, do better hydrological hy-
pothesis-testing? Yes, we should, and to do so requires
more careful attention to all steps of the modeling process,
including a more clear articulation of multiple working
hypotheses and subhypotheses, more robust numerical
implementation, more robust inference, and more incisive
model diagnostics.
4. B12 Perspectives on Our Modeling Approach
[33] B12 have unfortunately misread our opinion paper
in two important ways—they suggest that we are against
model ‘‘rejection,’’ and that we deny the role of ‘‘subjectiv-
ity.’’ This reﬂects the narrow focus of B12 in terms of com-
parisons between GLUE and Bayesian methods, whereas
our opinion paper presented a much broader and (in our
view) a more balanced view of hypothesis testing.
4.1. Is Model Rejection a Good Thing?
[34] B12 state that model hypotheses will never actually
be rejected in a formal Bayesian framework, because Bayes
ratios only rank models relative to each other. And later in
the paper they state that ‘‘. . .rejection, properly justiﬁed, is a
good thing. It forces a reconsideration of what is causing the
failure, which might be either the model hypotheses or disin-
formative data. It is then not really clear to us why the authors
argue against a rejectionist framework, especially when they
cite Popper in support of more rigorous hypothesis testing.’’
[35] The key point here is ‘‘properly justiﬁed.’’ We are
not arguing against model rejection per se – rather we are
arguing against the blunt, ‘‘lumped’’ approach to model
rejection that remains commonplace in the hydrological
community. We seek to scrutinize individual hypotheses
(to the extent that the data allows it), and select speciﬁc
model components that best describe the processes they are
intended to simulate. We point out that this approach ‘‘. . .is
consistent with the philosophy employed . . . in TOPMO-
DEL, which is presented as a set of concepts, rather than a
ﬁxed structure, based on the hypothesis that topography
controls saturated areas and base ﬂow.’’ This approach
avoids rejecting perfectly good modeling concepts. Later in
the opinion paper we state ‘‘. . .by comparing model repre-
sentations at the level of model subcomponents it becomes
possible to select the best component hypotheses from dif-
ferent models, thereby avoiding the need to reject entire
models (this makes better use of insights gained during
model development).’’ We are therefore in favor of model
rejection, but only when applied in a very precise way.
4.2. Subjectivity Perfectly Acceptable in the Absence
of Stronger Knowledge
[36] We agree with B12 that it is necessary—and beneﬁ-
cial!—to incorporate subjective judgment into the model
evaluation process. In fact, our opinion paper made many
statements to this effect, including that ‘‘the apparent struc-
tural simplicity suggested in the absence of accurate quanti-
tative (‘‘hard’’) information should be judged against
independent knowledge available from general hydrologi-
cal theory and/or any qualitative (‘‘soft’’) ﬁeldwork evi-
dence. In other words, model evaluation requires a mix of
qualitative and quantitative insights.’’
[37] We do not claim that the Bayesian approach to hy-
pothesis testing avoids subjectivity. On the contrary, the use
of subjective knowledge is a key part of the Bayesian
approach, and is actually what distinguishes Bayesian and fre-
quentist methods. Unlike a frequentist, a Bayesian modeler is
prepared to represent subjective knowledge using probability
distributions. This has been the subject of immense debates in
the statistical community, and is not necessarily universally
accepted—many proponents of frequentist methods still dis-
agree with using subjective knowledge in Bayes equation.
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[38] Nor do we claim that merely formulating the likeli-
hood function using a common probability distribution
(e.g., the Gaussian distribution of residual errors) is ‘‘objec-
tive’’ or ‘‘formal.’’ First, non-Gaussian distributions used in
the extended GLUE methodology, such as uniform, trian-
gular, and trapezoidal, etc., are neither ‘‘informal’’ nor
‘‘subjective’’—they are just as ‘‘statistical’’ and suitable for
Bayesian analysis as Gaussian distributions. Second, and
much more importantly, being subjective in formulating
hypotheses, if this means using qualitative insights, is not
forbidden in science or in Bayesian statistics—rather the
aim of ‘‘formal’’ methodologies is to explicitly formulate
all assumptions and hypotheses, and apply focused and
stringent diagnostics so that propositions that are not sup-
ported by the empirical evidence are improved or rejected.
This rejection is conditional on the available data and prior
knowledge and is hence not ﬁnal—new evidence and/or
data may require revisiting previously rejected hypotheses
in a new light.
5. Concluding Remarks
[39] The early GLUE publications were among the ﬁrst
to recognize and widely critique the weaknesses of their
contemporary calibration methods, and propose alternative
approaches for investigating uncertainty in hydrological
models [e.g., Beven and Binley, 1992; Freer et al., 1996].
Their efforts have been followed up by generations of
hydrologists and scientists in many other disciplines, and
have helped to more seriously address the challenge of
uncertainty in environmental modeling.
[40] As our community matures, it is important to continue
improving model analysis strategies, taking advantage of
ongoing advances in environmental physics, data collection
and mathematical modeling. We enjoy active and productive
collaborations with many in the GLUE community, and—
though differences of opinion remain (as is acutely evident in
this exchange)—these collaborations are resulting in tangible
improvements in our model analysis methods. We agree with
B12 when they state ‘‘. . .the issues raised here are not going
to be resolved easily’’ and we agree that further develop-
ments and comparisons between different methods are of
value. We hope that this comment/exchange helps deﬁne
tractable ways forward for those interested in improving the
process of model development and evaluation.
[41] Acknowledgments. We are grateful to John England, George
Kuczera, Laurent Pﬁster, Ben Renard and David Rupp for their construc-
tive criticisms of an earlier version of this manuscript.
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